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Abstract
The dilemma of reconciling migration control functions
and State obligations for refugee protection has under-
lined much of the immigration and asylum debate in the
European Union. In recent years, numerous measures
have been introduced to block access to refugee status de-
termination. This paper focuses on EU policies of non-en-
trée as they relate to the interception of individuals en
route to Europe. It argues that there is a fundamental im-
balance in the Union’s activities relating to asylum and
migration management with recent measures having the
effect of undermining the right to seek asylum and effec-
tively blocking access to protection.
Résumé
Les débats au sein de l’Union européenne sur les ques-
tions de l’immigration et du droit d’asile ont été marqués
par la problématique de comment réconcilier les fonc-
tions de contrôle de l’immigration et les obligations de
l’état en matière de protection des réfugiés. De nombreu-
ses mesures ont été adoptées au cours des dernières an-
nées pour bloquer l’accès au processus de détermination
du droit d’asile. Cet article examine les politiques de non
entrée de l’Union Européenne, tout spécialement en rela-
tion avec la pratique d’interception d’individus en route
pour l’Europe. L’article soutient que les activités de
l’Union Européenne en matière de gestion de la question
de l’immigration et du droit d’asile souffrent d’un dés-
équilibre fondamental, et que les mesures récentes ont eu
pour conséquence d’affaiblir le droit d’asile et d’interdire
l’accès à la protection.
I. Interception in Europe
T
he dilemma of reconciling migration control func-
tions and State obligations for the protection of refu-
gees has underlined much of the debate on
immigration and asylum policy in the European Union. In
recent years, numerous measures have been introduced to
block access to refugee status determination. These have
included mechanisms that operate as barriers, either pre-
venting asylum seekers from access to the territory of a
European country where they could seek and find protec-
tion, or, alternatively, for those who manage to reach the
shores of potential asylum states, applying admissibility cri-
teria which allow states to deport them without offering an
effective possibility of having their asylum applications ex-
amined in substance. This paper will focus on the policies of
non-entrée or non-arrival as they relate to the interception
of individuals en route to Europe.
Interception has been defined by UNHCR as “encom-
passing all measures applied by a State outside its national
territory in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the move-
ment of persons without the required documentation
crossing international borders by land, air or sea and mak-
ing their way to the country of prospective destination.”1 In
the context of the European Union, interception practices
need to be considered within the broader process of har-
monization of asylum and immigration measures. In this
process, the management of migration flows has been seen
as “one of the three essential elements together with coop-
eration with countries of origin and the integration of legal
immigrants for a comprehensive and therefore effective
immigration policy.”2
In October 1999, the European Council held a special
meeting in Tampere, Finland, on the establishment of an
area of freedom, security, and justice. There, EU heads of
state committed the Union “to develop(ing) common poli-
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cies on asylum and immigration while taking into account
the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop
illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it
and commit related international crimes.” In fighting ille-
gal immigration, the special meeting concluded that “com-
mon policies must be based on principles which are both
clear to our own citizens and also offer guarantees to those
who seek protection in or access to the European Union.”3
NGOs at the time welcomed the formulation of this para-
graph as an affirmation of the Union’s commitment to
ensuring a balanced approach which allowed for full com-
pliance with the absolute respect of the right to seek asylum
when introducing immigration control measures.4
The importance of a  balanced approach  in the  fight
against illegal immigration was reiterated in the November
2001 Commission Communication on a Common Policy on
Illegal Immigration5 and the “Proposal for a Comprehensive
Plan  to Combat  Illegal Immigration and  Trafficking of
Human Beings in the European Union,” approved by the
Justice and Home Affairs Council on 28 February 2002.6
Both documents provide that “measures relating to the
fight against illegal immigration have to balance the right
to decide whether to accord or refuse admission to the
territory to third country nationals and the obligation to
protect those genuinely in need of international protec-
tion.” In doing so, Member States were called upon to
“explore possibilities of offering rapid access to protection
so that refugees do not need to resort to illegal immigration
or people smugglers.”7
Notwithstanding these affirmations, an overview of EU
policy debate and initiatives in recent years would highlight
the absence of a real balance in the activities of the Union
in relation to asylum and migration management. This is
evident in the Conclusions of the European Council meeting
in Laeken in December 2001, set up to assess the progress
in  the two years since  Tampere.8 It is  also  clear in the
Conclusions of the Seville European Council meeting which,
beyond a timetable for agreeing upon the asylum measures
under discussion, mostly limited itself to reaching consen-
sus on border control enforcement measures, the conclu-
sion of readmission agreements, and the evaluation of
agreements  with  host  and  transit  countries to promote
co-operation in the fight against illegal immigration.9 With
deterrence rather than protection being the key priority for
most EU Member States, a range of measures has been put
in place that has had the effect of undermining the right to
seek asylum and effectively blocking access to Europe. The
following sections will consider some of these measures in
turn and will conclude by setting out some of their impli-
cations.
A. Visa Policies
On 15 March 2001, a Council Regulation was adopted listing
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose
nationals are exempt from that requirement.10 The regula-
tion includes a common list of 131 countries whose nation-
als must  have a  visa  when entering  the  territory  of  the
European Union, among them being a considerable number
of refugee producing countries such as Afghanistan, So-
malia, Sudan, and Iraq. A visa policy is a legitimate tool for
controlling immigration. When, however,  it is aimed at
blocking access to protection of persons fleeing persecution
and grave human rights violations, it is in flagrant contra-
diction of the institution of asylum and international human
rights and refugee norms. At the time of the Seville meeting
in May 2002, the European Council called for a review of the
list of third countries whose nationals require visas or are
exempt from that requirement.11 In responding, NGOs
asked for the introduction of exemptions from visa require-
ments for persons fleeing countries suffering civil wars or
systematic abuses of human rights in order to enable them
to gain access to Europe legally.12 Although this was not
taken  up by Member States in the recent review of the
regulation on visas in March 2003,13 it is encouraging that
some of the current debate is shifting towards the develop-
ment of an EU system of “protected entry procedures.” This
term describes arrangements that would allow non-nation-
als “to approach the potential host state outside its territory
with a claim for asylum or other forms of international
protection and to be granted an entry permit in case of a
positive response to that claim, be it preliminary or final.”14
Such arrangements already exist in some Member States on
a formalized basis15 while some other Member States allow
access through informal measures on an exceptional basis.16
In this context, a recent European Commission publica-
tion, Study on the Feasibility of Processing Asylum Claims
outside the EU against the Background of the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System and the Goal of a Common Asylum
Procedure, has identified five proposals which Member
States could consider when developing protected entry pro-
cedures in the future, ranging from a flexible use of the visa
regime to the introduction of a sponsorship model, the
development of an EU Regional Task Force and EU Re-
gional Nodes, gradual harmonization through a Directive
based on best practices, and the development of a Schengen
Asylum Visa.17 Out of these proposals, two have been sin-
gled out by the Commission for further exploration relating
to the viability of setting up an EU regional presence “to
provide expertise to local authorities where needed and
operate a referral system, matching different needs with
appropriate solutions” and the gradual harmonization
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through a Directive based upon best practices of protected
entry procedures.18 In light of the difficulties and hardship
facing refugees seeking access to Europe, any proposals that
aim at increasing the options for people to obtain legal
access to protection are to be welcome. The focus, however,
needs to remain on facilitating access to protection for
those in need of international protection. Here, in the light
of the emphasis placed by some EU Member States on the
orderly and managed arrival of refugees, a risk exists that
the availability of protected entry systems might be used as
the justification for prejudicing the treatment of asylum
claims of persons arriving spontaneously in Europe.19
B. Carrier Sanctions
Strict visa policies operate in conjunction with sanctions
imposed on transport carriers for bringing into the territory
of Member States passengers who are not in possession of
travel documents and visas required by national or interna-
tional regulations. An EU Directive on carrier sanctions was
formally adopted on 28 June 2001, supplementing the pro-
visions of Article 26 of the Schengen Convention.20 This lays
down the obligations of carriers transporting foreign na-
tionals into the territory of EU Member States and provides
for the harmonization of financial penalties in cases where
carriers fail to  comply  with  its provisions.21 Beyond the
obligations of the Schengen Convention, carriers are now
expected to assume responsibility for returning third-coun-
try nationals in transit if they have been refused entry to the
State of destination and have been sent back to the transit
country, or if the carrier that was to take them to the country
of destination refuses to allow them to board.22 They are also
responsible for immediately finding means of onward trans-
portation in the cases where they are unable to effect the
return of third-country nationals whose entry has been
refused and for bearing any related costs including the cost
of staying in  the country until return can  be  effected.23
Failure to engage in the exercise of immigration control
functions risks penalties of 3000 euros minimum for each
person carried.24
In UNHCR’s opinion, carrier sanctions “should only be
implemented in a manner consistent with refugee protec-
tion principles and should be accompanied by appropriate
safeguards so as not to hinder access to status determina-
tion procedures by persons in need of protection.” Sanc-
tions should be enforced only in the event of negligence in
checking documents; if the person is admitted to the asylum
procedure, carriers should be exempted from liability.25
The weakest of safeguards are included in the EU Directive
on carrier sanctions. Despite affirming that its application
is without prejudice to obligations resulting from the Refu-
gee Convention, the Directive provides no safeguards to
ensure protection from refoulement of persons for whom
carriers are unable to effect return and for whom carriers
are therefore obliged to arrange onward transportation.
Nor does the Directive provide for any access to remedies
for asylum seekers who have been refused permission to
board a plane or are being forced to return or be trans-
ported to a country where they might face violations of their
rights in the sense of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention
or Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
With regard to the provisions on financial penalties, al-
though Article 4.2 sets out that these are “without prejudice
to Member States’ obligations in cases where a third coun-
try national seeks international protection,” there is no
express requirement for Member States to exempt airlines
from paying penalties if “the third country national is ad-
mitted to the territory for asylum purposes.”26 This was a
formulation that was included in the original proposal for
a Council Directive on carriers sanctions in recognition of
the reality of refugee flight to safety which at times involves
the use of forged documents. It was subsequently upheld in
the report on the proposal by the European Parliament’s
Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and
Home Affairs. There, a call was made for an exception from
penalties if “a third-country national seeks asylum imme-
diately after arriving on the territory of the State of destina-
tion; the person is granted refugee status or leave to remain
under a subsidiary form of protection (or) the person is
admitted to the asylum determination procedure.”27 Re-
grettably, the original formulation was rejected on the basis
of Germany’s objections that it “could make penalties for
carriers ineffective and increase asylum applications,”28 a
position reiterated by the Irish Minister for Justice during
negotiations of carrier-sanctions-related provisions of the
Irish Immigration Bill in early 2003.
Faced with increased obligations and the threat of sub-
stantial  financial penalties  and associated costs, carriers
have introduced extensive checking facilities at airports as
well as major ports of entry to the European Union, the
result being the privatization of government immigration
control functions. Rather than trained government officials
exercising their functions under effective judicial control
and in line with their government’s obligations under in-
ternational law, the responsibility of screening refugees has
been delegated to transport companies and their personnel
who are untrained in refugee and human rights law and
ill-positioned to undertake any asylum determination
functions, but also unaccountable for their actions under
international law. The carrier industry, concerned mostly
about escalating costs, has sought to challenge the legal
framework in certain cases. In Sweden, despite the deadline
of 11 February 2003 for transposition of the Directive on
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carrier sanctions into national legislation, the government,
expecting that it will not secure the necessary majority in
Parliament, has yet to introduce amendments to the Swed-
ish Aliens Act that would allow it to impose financial pen-
alties on airlines. SAS, the Swedish national carrier,
commenting on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ memo-
randum on carriers’ responsibility in the Aliens Act, has
expressed strong opposition against airlines engaging in
assessing which passengers have valid reasons to seek asy-
lum, arguing that “this assessment requires a considerable
amount of time for the concerned authorities and results in
a careful investigation. The flight company on the other
hand, has about a minute during check in to make a similar
judgement for each  individual  person.”29 The company
further objected to laying down general guidelines for air-
port staff in order to block certain types of “suspect” pas-
sengers on the basis that this might seem discriminatory.
In Austria, a November 2002 ruling by a court of appeal
of the Land of Lower Austria has overturned a decision
reached in the first instance to fine an airline a total of
36,000 euros for transporting twelve insufficiently docu-
mented passengers to Austria. The judgment considered
that carriers could not be expected to detect forged travel
documents, as they were often difficult to distinguish from
genuine ones.30 This follows a landmark decision by the
Austrian Constitutional Court in October 2001 which de-
clared relevant provisions of the 1997 Austrian Aliens Act
null and void on the basis that they did not specify exactly
what kind of obligations carriers are obliged to fulfill when
transporting passengers to Austria nor whether, or how, in
fulfilling their obligations carriers needed to take into con-
sideration Austrian commitments under the Refugee Con-
vention.31
In Britain, a High Court judge ruled in December 2001
that holding lorry drivers responsible for transporting
stowaways is “unworkable in practice and unfair in law”
and the fine of £2,000 per stowaway is “ruinous for many
persons of ordinary means” and could amount to violations
of the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6
on the right to a fair trial and Article 1, Protocol No. 1, on
the protection of property) since a driver risks having his
vehicle confiscated if he cannot pay the fine immediately.32
This ruling was partially upheld at a Court of Appeal deci-
sion in February 2002 which led to changes in legislation
on carriers’ liability.33 Under the new law authorities are
required to take into account efforts made by lorry drivers
to prevent their vehicles from being misused by irregular
migrants when determining fines for abuse.
C. Externalization of Immigration Controls
Complementing the objectives of carrier sanctions provi-
sions, there has been an increase in recent years in the use of
other measures aimed at externalizing immigration con-
trols. These have taken the form of posting immigration
officers at diplomatic missions in countries from which EU
Member States want to reduce population movements to-
wards their borders. They have also involved the placement
of immigration and airline liaison officers at major interna-
tional airports and seaports in countries of origin and tran-
sit, with the task of assisting carriers and national authorities
to prevent the embarkation of undocumented and improp-
erly documented travellers. This is not a new phenomenon.
Some EU Member States have operated for some years a
system of stationing immigration officers in third countries
whose  airports are considered to  be  starting or transfer
points for illegal immigration. The Netherlands for example,
operates a network of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs)
which in 2001 consisted of nine officers in nine countries.34
During the same year, the UK had similar arrangements in
twenty locations for a total cost of £100,000. A key question
in relation to these arrangements has concerned the treat-
ment by officials responsible for externalized immigration
controls of persons fleeing persecution who might not be in
a position to comply with immigration formalities. Here, the
risk is that access to protection could be denied by Member
States acting in co-operation with the actual country from
which international protection is being sought.
In addition to the stationing of liaison officers who op-
erate in an advisory capacity, since 1999, the UK has intro-
duced legislative provisions that allow for immigration
rules to be operated extraterritorially and not only at British
ports of entry. On 18 July 2001, the UK in agreement with
the Czech Republic started a scheme at Prague Airport of
pre-entry clearance immigration controls. This aimed prin-
cipally at putting an end to the arrival of asylum seekers
from the Czech Republic, the vast majority of whom were
of Romani ethnic origin (Roma). The scheme has been
proven effective as a migration control tool.35 Its compli-
ance with the UK’s obligations under refugee and human
rights law, however, has been questioned. In a submission
on behalf of UNHCR to a British Court of Appeal dealing
with a case brought against the Home Secretary by the
European Roma Rights Centre and six Romani nationals,
the scheme was described as having “frustrate(d) the object
and purpose of the 1951 Convention contrary to the inter-
national legal principle of good faith…(and) rendered the
1951 Convention nugatory (as) it prevents provisions such
as Article 31 or 33 ever being engaged.”36 The scheme’s
compliance with anti-discrimination provisions has also
been questioned, given its focus on persons of Romani
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origin.37 Beyond the Prague practice, under a specific agree-
ment between France and the UK, British  immigration
officers now have the power to also exercise full immigra-
tion controls on passengers on Eurostar trains and those
embarking in French ports. In accordance with the 2002
National Immigration and Asylum Act, this power has been
extended to any port in the European Economic Area.38
At Community level, following the Seville Presidency
Conclusions, which call for implementation before the end
of 2002, a process has been underway for the development
of an EU network of Member States’ Immigration Liaison
Officers (ILOs).39 This will be based upon experiences of
previous joint projects run by individual Member States
such as the UK and Italy joint initiative on southeastern
Europe (in  operation  since 2001)40 and the Belgian-led
western Balkans ILO network (since December 2002). Un-
der this scheme, still under negotiation, it is proposed that
representatives of Member States will be posted at national
consular authorities of Member States in third countries,
relevant authorities of other Member States or competent
authorities of third countries, with a view to contributing
to the prevention and combating of illegal immigration, the
return of illegal immigrants, and the management of legal
migration. Member States’ officers will be expected to
maintain direct contacts with the competent authorities in
the host country and any appropriate organization within
the host country. They will also be expected to constitute
local and regional co-operation networks for the purpose,
inter alia, of exchanging information, coordinating posi-
tions to be adopted with commercial carriers, and adopting
common approaches to the methods of collecting and re-
porting strategically relevant information, including risk
analyses.41 A report of their activities as well as the situation
in the host country will be submitted to the Council and the
Commission by the Member State holding the presidency or
serving as acting presidency by the end of each semester.42
The inclusion of a provision for an activities’ report of
the proposed ILO network might be an important step
towards ensuring transparency and overcoming the secrecy
characterizing the operations of national ILO arrangements
to date. What is needed, moreover, is the adoption of a
common approach among Member States’ immigration or
airline liaison officers as to the procedure for dealing with
cases that might come under  the  scope of the Refugee
Convention or other relevant human rights instruments.
Such an approach should tacitly acknowledge the realities
of refugee flight which frequently involve reliance upon
forged documents and be in full compliance with Article 31
of the Refugee Convention.
D. Interception in the Context of EU’s External Relations
An area that has been a focus of intensified activity by the
European Union and Member States relates to co-operation
with third countries in the management of migration flows.
In late 1998, in an attempt to integrate asylum and immi-
gration concerns into all areas of EU external policy, the
High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum
(HLWG) was established with the task of preparing cross-
pillar action plans for the countries of origin and transit of
asylum seekers and migrants. The task of this Group until
2002 was to design EU Action Plans and develop practical
and operational proposals to increase co-operation with
countries of origin and transit that enhanced the capacity of
the EU to manage migration flows. Six regions or countries
were identified, including Afghanistan and the neighbour-
ing region, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Albania
and the neighbouring region. Action Plans on these coun-
tries/regions were submitted to the European Council in
Tampere which agreed on the continuation of the HLWG’s
mandate and called for a “comprehensive approach to mi-
gration addressing political, human rights and development
issues in countries and regions of origin and transit.”43
The first phase of the implementation of the HLWG
Action Plans was characterized by an “impression of imbal-
ance,” a rather euphemistic term for describing an exclusive
focus on migration controls.44 A report evaluating the work
of the Group, prepared for the Nice European Council
meeting in December 2000, underlined that “countries in
which the plans are directed feel that they are the target of
unilateral policy by the Union focusing on repressive ac-
tion.”45 It stated that “the actual implementation of the
plans respects the balance originally sought between the
various areas (foreign policy, development, asylum and mi-
gration),” arguing that “it would be detrimental to the credi-
bility of this new European Union policy to allow one aspect
to predominate owing to difficulties in implementation.”46
A new momentum in the integration of immigration
policy into the European Union’s relations with third coun-
tries can be found since the meeting of EU Heads of State
in Seville on 21–22 June 2002.47 The Seville European
Council urged that “any future cooperation, association or
equivalent agreement which the European Union con-
cludes with any country should include a clause on joint
management of migration flows and on compulsory read-
mission in the event of illegal immigration.” The Council
further reaffirmed the necessity of carrying out a systematic
assessment of relations with third countries which do not
co-operate in combating illegal immigration, concluding
that “inadequate cooperation by a country could hamper
the establishment of closer relations between that country
and the European Union.”
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Following Seville, a set of criteria has been developed to
identify countries of origin and transit of particular inter-
est.48 So far, nine countries have been selected for the pur-
pose of intensified co-operation including: Albania, China,
Morocco, Russia, Ukraine, Tunisia, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Libya, and Turkey.49 Co-operation with them
is seen as not only desirable but also essential given that they
represent  key source and  transit  countries for irregular
migration. Further, plans are underway to include a clause
on joint management of migration flows and compulsory
readmission in future Community agreements with, for ex-
ample, Syria, Iran, Mercosur, and the Andean Community.50
What can be made of the plethora of initiatives on co-
operation in the management of migration flows with third
countries and their impact on the right to seek and enjoy
asylum? The establishment of the High Level Working
Group was originally seen as “a potentially important step
towards a more comprehensive, EU cross-pillar approach
to migration and asylum policy.”51 Warning against the
Group’s work solely focusing on illegal immigration to the
European Union, measures were called for co-operation to
address the root causes of forced and voluntary migration,
including poverty reduction, protection of human rights,
and promotion of democratic institutions. Nevertheless, an
overview of the activities of the High Level Working Group
and the Union’s initiatives following the Seville Conclu-
sions highlights a clear emphasis on measures to fight illegal
immigration which compares poorly with the level of atten-
tion paid to the root causes of refugee flight and to measures
to improve refugee protection. The November 2002 Gen-
eral Affairs Council Conclusions illustrate this point. They
identify a set of parameters for “all existing or future com-
prehensive dialogues pursued… (which) should where
relevant, include subjects such as return, readmission and
documentation, implementation of agreements on man-
agement of migration flows, preventive policies and tech-
nical assistance geared towards institutional capacity
building”.52 No reference is made here to strengthening the
rule of law or building institutional capacity to safeguard
human rights and provide for effective refugee protection.
This is also the case in the Commission’s Communication
on Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union’s
Relations with Third Countries.53 Commenting on the lim-
ited focus of the document’s conclusions on return policies
and border controls, a number of NGOs expressed concern
about the potential risk of the fight against irregular migra-
tion extending “beyond overshadowing the international
protection regime to also taking hostage of the develop-
ment sector.”54
Examples of actions approved in relation to some of the
countries selected for intensified co-operation show a clear
focus on control measures. In the case of Morocco, a pro-
gram to combat illegal  immigration  by supporting  im-
provements to the management of border checks has been
adopted for the period 2002–04 with a budget of 40 million
euros. The money will be used to improve surveillance
measures on Moroccan sea and land borders and to set up
an  information centre  to  advise  potential candidates of
illegal immigration on how to seek entry into the EU by
legal means. Likewise, negotiations are currently underway
upon the request of the Italian government for the EU to
ease restrictions on the purchase of military equipment by
Libya so that it can increase its coast guard capacity to
prevent the clandestine departure of vessels carrying irregu-
lar migrants to Europe. Further, within the framework of
plans to create a “friendly neighbourhood with whom the
EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” the
EU intends, inter alia, to assist neighbouring countries in
reinforcing their efforts to combat illegal migration and to
establish mechanisms for returns, especially in relation to
illegal transit migration.55
Against a backdrop of control-oriented measures, the
absence of a concrete commitment for Community action
to address the human rights abuses, organized violence, and
conflict that are the main causes for involuntary migration
becomes apparent. So is the absence of any measures that
engage the Union and its Member States in meaningful
responsibility sharing with first countries of asylum in re-
gions of origin where the majority of refugees are located.56
Rather, responsibility shifting seems to be the name of the
game. Faced with no options of protection, many individ-
ual refugees take risks in the hands of smugglers and traf-
fickers: the result is a rise in human suffering at the borders
of Europe.
II. Europe’s Reality: The Implications of
Interception Measures for Refugee Protection
What has been the cumulative effect on refugee protection
of  visa policies, sanctions, and  pressure on countries of
transit to co-operate in the fight against illegal immigration?
In a few words, the de facto criminalization of the act of
seeking asylum. Without any other option, people in need
of international protection are forced to rely on smugglers
and traffickers who can often provide the only viable means
of entry into Europe. The absence of hard data on trafficking
and smuggling makes it difficult to quantify the extent of the
problem across the European Union.57 Some ad hoc statistics
are, however, illustrative. In 2002, for example, 16,504 boat
migrants were apprehended for trying to reach Spain ille-
gally by sea, an average of forty-six people per day. During
the same period, thirty-five bodies were discovered at sea;
this figure concerns the number of bodies found in Spanish
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territorial waters and not those who drowned while attempt-
ing to reach Spain by sea. Similarly, 3,766 stowaways were
found in lorries and containers crossing to the UK from
Belgian ports, an increase of 40 per cent from figures in 1999.
As the costs in terms of human suffering increase, the physi-
cal barriers to entry to Europe have become higher and
methods of interception more sophisticated. During, for
example, the last six months of 2002, seventeen joint opera-
tions, pilot projects, and ad hoc centres of illegal migration
were approved under intriguing names such as Ulysses,58
Triton,59 Orca,60 RIO IV,61 and Project Deniz.62
More recently, in February 2003, the UK government
proposed the establishment of protected zones in third
countries to which those arriving in EU Member States and
claiming asylum could be transferred to have their claims
processed. Such centres might be on transit routes into the
EU and might “also receive illegal migrants intercepted en
route to the EU before they had lodged an asylum claim but
where they had a clear intention of doing so.”63 The UK
proposals have been strongly opposed by British and inter-
national NGOs as “unlawful, unworkable and unprinci-
pled” and as an attempt to undermine the rights-based
global refugee protection regime.64 They have also been
seen as an attempt to shift responsibility for hosting refu-
gees to poorer countries, despite the reality that many
countries close to regions of origin of refugee populations
host far greater numbers of refugees and asylum seekers
than do EU Member States.65
Although the British government has recently claimed to
have moved away from the idea of transit processing centres
on the edge of Europe, they plan to move ahead with their
plans of regional protection zones.66 In doing so, they might
work in co-operation with what they have termed “the
coalition of the willing,” countries such as The Netherlands
and Denmark who are interested in exploring ways of
providing protection in regions of origin. At the EU level,
the Thessaloniki European Council, held in June 2003, has
asked that the Commission “explore(s) all parameters in
order to ensure more orderly and managed entry in the EU
of persons in need of international protection, and to ex-
amine ways and means to enhance the protection capacity
of regions of origin.” A comprehensive report on these
issues is expected to be presented before June 2004 suggest-
ing measures including legal implications. Further, the
Council’s Conclusions acknowledge the importance of de-
veloping an evaluation mechanism to monitor relations
with third countries which do not co-operate with the EU
in combating illegal immigration. Among the topics which
are identified to be of primary importance are the efforts of
third countries in “border control and interception of ille-
gal immigrants, combating of trafficking in human  be-
ings… cooperation on visa policy and possible adaptation
of visa systems.”67 The European Commission will be ex-
pected  to report annually  on the  results  of monitoring
co-operation with third countries.
In 1997, EU Member States agreed to the Amsterdam
Treaty, thereby committing themselves to the creation of
an “area of freedom, security and justice.” In undertaking
this task, they agreed upon the development of common
standards for asylum based on the principles of solidarity
and responsibility sharing. Since the Treaty came into force
in May 1999, a process has been underway to develop a
Common European Asylum System. The development of
such a system has been seen as a question of fundamental
justice if not of absolute necessity. In this context, the
various measures under discussion during the last few years
have been considered to have the potential to represent an
important step away from the “protection lottery” cur-
rently in place in Europe.
There is no doubt that some progress has been made
towards the development of common asylum standards.
Notwithstanding this, an overview of the range of measures
to fight illegal immigration, as compared with progress
made in the area of common asylum standards, would
indicate the presence of a fundamentally imbalanced ap-
proach in the Union’s work towards the creation of an area
of “freedom, security and justice.” Member States have
consistently been prepared to agree upon control-related
measures while opposing the introduction of any standards
which might result in substantial changes in their national
asylum systems. Although some potentially positive pro-
posals are under discussion, in particular with regard to the
development of an EU resettlement scheme and a harmo-
nized approach on protected entry procedures, the reality
on the ground is of persons in need of protection being
denied the possibility of legal exit from their countries or
regions of origin. In the fight against illegal immigration,
the risk remains that EU Member States might find them-
selves acting in co-operation with the very countries from
which refugees might be fleeing. In the search for order and
a managed approach, the danger is also one of irrevocably
compromising the fundamental right to seek and enjoy
asylum in the territory of the European Union.
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